

## THE MIAMI-FLORIDA EUROPEAN UNION CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

# The European Union as a global actor in the post-Lisbon Treaty period

### Conference Participants: ABSTRACTS

*March 10-11, 2011*

Foreign policy is an essential part of a state's conduct of international affairs, and it is similarly important for the EU's relations with the rest of the world. In the past, the European Union's capabilities as global actor have been compromised by a variety of factors, ranging from a lack of cohesive identity based on diverging national interests to an expectations-capabilities gap, to the predominant presence of other powerful actors such as NATO. Part of the difficulties of the Union's capacity to coherently act remains also in the (self)assessments that the EU should constitute a 'normative', 'soft', 'transformative' or civilian power – however undefined, whereas most participation in global security affairs favors traditional military-based approaches.

The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 has opened the door for a more coherent foreign policy formulation for the EU, including the institutionalization of a semi-permanent president, a de-facto Foreign Minister, the development of an External Action Service of the Union, and the increase in enhanced cooperation procedures designed to make the EU act more efficiently across economic, diplomatic and security sectors. We are interested in exploring the effect of these treaty changes for the relations between the EU and its partners. For one, we aim to explore if the Union has become a more effective foreign policy actor as a result of the treaty changes, and secondly, we strive to discern the supranational-intergovernmental balance in these innovations. Finally, we want to deduct lessons from these post-Lisbon configurations for a better determination of the most appropriate and probable development of the Union as a military or civilian power.

In order to do so, we propose three thematic panels and a geographically-oriented roundtable:

#### **1. The EU's external identity & actorness**

We welcome papers problematizing the externally ascribed as well as internally constructed role of the EU as actor in global politics (normative, civilian, soft or military power?)

#### **2. The institutional reconfiguration of foreign affairs after Lisbon**

Here, a close examination of the institutional (executive-based) changes in the post-Lisbon period is warranted (HR Foreign Affairs & Security Policy, Council President, External Action Service etc)

#### **3. Roundtable on Regional/National Perspectives on EU Foreign Relations**

#### **4. Inter-institutional & regional relations**

The main focus of this panel will be on the EU's relations as security community and regional economic power to other regions and blocs.

## **ACADEMIC PANELISTS**

### **Stephanie Anderson**

*Associate Professor of Political Science and Adjunct Professor of International Studies and Gender and Women's and Studies  
University of Wyoming*

**TITLE: “The Securitization of the EU’s Development Policy: How the EAS attempts to legitimize and streamline EU Foreign and Security policy”**

#### **ABSTRACT**

The EU has strained to find its identity as a security and defense power. The EU, historically, has more experience and credibility in the area of its development policy. Given the EU’s history of development promotion and recent efforts to expand and clarify its foreign policy objectives, it should not be surprising that development and security goals often resemble each other. This paper argues that the conflation of traditional security concerns with the overall development policy of the EU indicates an expansion of and an effort to legitimize the EU’s foreign and security policy. However, the lack of a clear distinction between security and development strategies acts as both a hindrance, in terms of operational clarity, and an asset, in terms of justification, to the formulation of a more coherent EU foreign policy, especially after the passage of the Lisbon Treaty.

### **Astrid B. Boening**

*European Union Center/Jean Monnet Chair Postdoctoral Fellow and Editor  
University of Miami*

**TITLE: “The EU’s Policy Towards its Southern Neighborhood Evaluated from the Perspective of Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution and the Balance of Power in the Euro-Mediterranean Region”.**

#### **ABSTRACT**

The European Union’s (EU) foreign policy towards its southern neighbors is currently anchored i.a. in the Union for the Mediterranean (as an upgrade of the EuroMed Partnership, which represented the southern dimension of the EU’ European Neighborhood Program (ENP). The EU’s political, economic and social-cultural assistance towards its southern neighbors aims to enhance the prosperity and stability in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The EU’s soft power role in the greater Mediterranean is normative in terms of a “notable actor constellation” in the Euro-Mediterranean, which includes i.a. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation, as well as emerging regional hegemon, such as Turkey, and “extra-regional” emerging hegemon, such as Russia and China.

The current shifting balance of power in the Euro-Mediterranean is not only intra- and interregional (such as also involving the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), but also local, as the Jasmine Revolution in the winter of 2010/11 shows. The sending into exile of Tunisian dictator Ben Ali following popular protests over high (especially youth) unemployment, food inflation, corruption, and inadequate living conditions gives rise to the question about the EU’s preparedness for the potentially spreading popular uprisings along its southern border (i.e. north Africa and the Middle East), and the reaction of its new External Action Service to this threat.

**Mai'a K. Davis Cross**

*Assistant Professor of International Relations  
University of Southern California*

**TITLE: “A European Foreign Service: Turning Diplomacy Inside-Out”**

**ABSTRACT**

The European Union’s Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, is the most significant EU treaty since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which saw the advent of the common currency, the pillar system, police and judicial cooperation, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and so on. In particular, the Lisbon Treaty contains significant provisions designed to achieve a stronger foreign policy dimension for Europe, including the appointment of a “permanent” president and “foreign minister”.

This paper focuses on one of the treaty’s most striking innovations, the creation of a fully integrated diplomatic structure – a European Foreign Service – formally launched on 1 December 2010. This diplomatic service, technically known as the European External Action Service (EEAS), is the first supranational diplomatic service of its kind. Its mandate is to serve the new foreign policy chief, Lady Catherine Ashton, who is the key figure behind its construction. The recent steps forward in the actual implementation of the EEAS – such as the transformation of delegations into embassies and the appointment of dozens of EU ambassadors – represent a major transition towards a new kind of diplomacy in the international arena. One central issue is how much independence and power this new entity will have, considering it must accurately and persuasively represent 27 different voices on the world stage. The Lisbon Treaty does not provide much guidance in this respect.

While the construction of such a large, supranational corps of diplomats is wholly unprecedented, I argue that the EU’s successful track-record in its own *internal* diplomacy contains many lessons for its future *external* diplomacy. If these lessons are implemented well, the European foreign service will be coherent and effective, transforming the EU’s foreign policy landscape and catapulting it onto the world stage. If not, this new institution risks becoming a weak bureaucratic experiment that could end up working at cross purposes with the diplomatic apparatus of the member-states already in place.

**Katie Verlin Laatikainen**

*Associate Professor and Chair, Political Sciences  
Adelphi University*

**TITLE: “Contested Ground: The Effort of the European Union to Enhance its Status in the UN General Assembly”**

**ABSTRACT**

“There is no reason why a regional organization of Europe should in any way conflict with the world organization of the United Nations. On the contrary, I believe that the larger synthesis will only survive if it is founded upon coherent natural groupings. There is already a natural grouping in the western hemisphere. We British have our own Commonwealth of Nations. These do not weaken, on the contrary they strengthen, the world organization. They are in fact its main support. And why should there not be a European group which could give a sense of enlarged patriotism and common citizenship to the distracted peoples of this turbulent and mighty continent? And why should it not take its rightful place with other great groupings and help to shape the onward destinies of men?”

--Speech by Sir Winston Churchill, Zurich, 19 September 1946

EU diplomats were reportedly surprised and embarrassed when their effort to enhance the EU's status in the UN General Assembly—consistent with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty—did not succeed during the 64<sup>th</sup> General Assembly. The draft resolution to enhance the EU's observer status and enable the new EU delegation to represent the Union instead of the EU member state holding the Presidency, was defeated by a motion to defer debate until the following year. The deferral motion was spearheaded by the African Union, the Caribbean Community, Iran, and others. The debate about the EU's enhanced status raises all sorts of questions about the inter-institutional relationship between the EU and the United Nations. This paper depicts the process of seeking enhanced status—the internal EU debate and crafting of the draft resolution, the EU's external consultations with UN member states and regions, and the outcome—which unfolded from January 2010 until the deferral vote on September 13, 2010. Several analytical frameworks are used to contextualize the failure of the EU to gain enhanced status: the symbolic nature of UN *politics*; issues of *institutional isomorphism* as other regional organizations such as Caricom attempted to highlight their own legitimate claim to enhanced status based upon their internal integration processes; and the EU's role in broader *transformations of multilateralism*.

**John McCormick**

*Jean Monnet Professor of EU Politics  
Indiana Campus of Indiana University*

**TITLE: “Europe – The Invisible Superpower”**

**ABSTRACT**

In the evolving debate about the changing nature of the international system, it is intriguing how so much attention is now focused on the rise of China and India, and what they will mean for the United States and international relations, while so little is focused on the European Union. Where it is mentioned at all, the role of the EU is qualified with talk of its lack of a joint military, its economic and demographic problems, and policy disagreements among its leaders. This paper will ask why the global role of the EU is so often downplayed, and whether this is reasonable in light of (a) the changing nature of power in the international system, and (b) the new template for political, economic and social priorities and values offered by the EU.

**Francesco Ortoleva**

*PhD Candidate, Department of Politics and International Relations  
Florida International University*

**TITLE: “Understanding EU Relations with Iran: Normative Power or Great Power Politics?”**

**ABSTRACT**

The EU's relations with Iran illustrate the complexity of assessing its foreign policy. The 2003 negotiations over Iran's nascent nuclear program were co-opted by Britain, France and Germany (EU3) and thus excluded other EU member states from representation, consultation and policy input. The EU3 continues to define the interests and preferences of the EU in its relations with Iran. How can this arrangement be explained and reconciled with the EU's continuing effort at forging a truly common and unified foreign policy? What effect does this segmented and differentiated policymaking have on the EU's relations with Iran?

This paper will argue that the EU3 arrangement used in its relations with Iran is illustrative of both the EU's non-hierarchical, segmented foreign policymaking and the traditional geopolitical interests of the three member states. It shall illustrate that EU foreign policymaking occurs in a partially segmented environment of functional specialization and division of tasks through small groups or networks of interested national and transnational actors. It will seek to explain the internal mechanisms of EU policy towards Iran and how this policy is reflective of the great power interests and preferences of the EU3 at the expense of a common foreign policy and the EU's theoretical normative power.

**Nicole Warmington-Granston**

*PhD Student, Department of Politics and International Relations  
Florida International University*

**TITLE: “The CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement: A Look at its Impact on EU-CARICOM Relations and Caribbean Regional Integration”**

**ABSTRACT**

On 15 October 2008, an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) was signed between the European Union (EU) and CARIFORUM (CARICOM plus the Dominican Republic). It establishes a free trade area for goods and services that is compatible with the WTO central principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity. It seeks to meet sustainable development objectives through the deepening and strengthening of Caribbean integration, the integration of CARIFORUM states into the world market, the promotion of investment opportunities in the region, and capacity building in trade matters. However, the EPA has been met with opposition from some Caribbean academics, policymakers and government officials who believe that CARICOM leaders were forced into signing the agreement. They have voiced their dissatisfaction with the lack of consultation during the negotiation process as well as their fear of a loss of sovereignty to Europe and the subsequent ‘invasion’ of European businesses into the Caribbean. In addition, they question the degree of economic, commercial, regional integration opportunities that the EPA presents. This paper aims to determine if these claims can be substantiated. It will be concluded that the regional integration that the EPA expects may be hindered due to CARICOM’s delay in fully establishing the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) and the negative impact of increased competition and openness may be minimal and limited in specific sectors, resulting in improved EU-CARICOM relations.

**Michael Williams**

*Lecturer in International Relations  
Royal Holloway University, London*

**TITLE: “EU-NATO Relations in the Afghan War”**

**ABSTRACT**

For the better part of two decades the US and Europe have argued over the development of a European defense organization. Washington worried that a European organization would undercut NATO, but by the end of the Bush Administration these fears had largely been left behind and the US supported to continued development of European Security and Defense Policy. For all of the talk, however, ESDP has oftentimes failed to produce a unified and robust European security policy. In operations like Afghanistan, the Americans continue to provide the bulk of the forces and the resources despite widespread European engagement. To complicate matters, the EU and NATO are both involved in Afghanistan, but yet the two organizations fail to cooperate effectively. This paper examines some of the problems in current EU-NATO relations via the experiences of both organizations in Afghanistan.