European Year of Development: approaches, issues & results

North-South ‘Partnerships’ in a Complex World: The Caribbean and EU

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Outline

1. Key Research Question
2. Theorising North-South Development Cooperation
3. Changing dimensions of EU development Cooperation in the Caribbean
4. Conclusions & Future Scenarios
Research Question

What does the current state of Caribbean-EU relations suggest about North-South ‘partnerships’ in a multiplex world?
Conceptual Guide

Critical International Theory (World Hegemony)

North-South Development Cooperation

New Regionalism (Development & Security Regionalism)

Caribbean Radical Tradition
“Successive dominant powers in the international system have shaped a world order that suits their interests, and have done so not only as a result of their coercive capabilities, but also because they have managed to generate broad consent for that order even among those who are disadvantaged by it.” (Robert Cox cited in Hobden & Jones, 2011:140).

“....Developing countries have to simultaneously resist and champion neoliberalism and globalisation” (Thomas Klak 1998)
EU ACP Development Cooperation
Traditional Paradigm

Historical dominance
Donor-Recipient Relationship

Legacy of dependency in the context of postcoloniality

Preferential Trade (Lomé)

Aid (EDF)

Political Dialogue
Total financial resources allocated to the European Development Fund between 1959 and 2020 (including funds for Overseas Countries and Territories)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Development Fund (EDF)</th>
<th>Financial resources (€ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st EDF 1959-1964</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd EDF 1964-1970</td>
<td>730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd EDF 1970-1975</td>
<td>887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th EDF 1975-1980</td>
<td>3,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th EDF 1980-1985</td>
<td>4,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th EDF 1985-1990</td>
<td>7,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th EDF 1990-1995</td>
<td>11,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th EDF 1995-2000</td>
<td>13,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th EDF 2000-2007</td>
<td>13,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th EDF 2008-2013</td>
<td>22,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th EDF 2014-2020</td>
<td>30,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Commission 2015, p. 2
Multiple Poles of Power (US, EU, BRICS)

Multiple and competing interests across multiple levels

Complex cross-cutting issues

Traditional & new Sites for engagement

Convergence of historical and contemporary challenges & new threats & opportunities
“We are paying the price for our own success. On many global indicators we are doing relatively well...Our indicators mask the developmental challenges we still face...”

...Most EU member states do not have historical ties with the Caribbean. There is still cooperation but there are new dynamics”

“In the most recent debates there was no mention of Latin America and the Caribbean. The EU has to focus on priorities like its Near Abroad – Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean – then our big partners like the United States.”

CARICOM Official, Barbados, Interview. Feb 15, 2016
Current Relationship

Caribbean & EU

Cotonou Partnership Agreement 2000

OCTs

Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy 2010

Political Dialogue

Development Cooperation

Economic & Trade Relations (EU-CARIFORUM EPA)

Post Cotonou 2020??

Changing National & Regional Dynamics
Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy (2010)

1. Regional integration
2. Reconstruction of Haiti
3. Climate change and natural disasters
4. Crime and security; and
5. Joint action in multilateral fora & on global issues

Guiding Principles of Joint Caribbean-EU Strategic Partnership

1. Co-ownership

2. Mutual accountability

3. Solidarity

4. Co-management

5. Co-responsibility
1. Regional Integration

Historical fragmentation & integration of the Caribbean by key EU member states

Lessons to be learnt from EU’s Model of integration
## The Allocation of Resources under the 10th EDF CRIP [2008-13]

### Programme Intervention Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmes</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Cost (million €)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Focal Area - Regional Economic Integration and Cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Economic Integration and Trade of the OECS Region</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>5.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. CSME and Economic Integration Programme</td>
<td></td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Support to Intra-CARIFORUM Economic &amp; Social Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 DR/Haiti Bi-National Cooperation Programme</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>13.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Programme of Support for Intra-CARIFORUM - CRITI Communications - CRITI</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Support for Wider Caribbean Cooperation Programme</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.595</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Support for the EPA Implementation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Support to CARIFORUM for EPA Implementation</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>28.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Regional Private Sector Development Programme</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>17.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Investing in Human Capital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Support to OECS Tourism and Hospitality Sector</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Institutional Support for CARPHA Agency</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL – Regional Economic Integration and Cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>147.505</td>
<td>89.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Non-Focal Area: Vulnerabilities and Social Issues</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. CARIFORUM Crime and Security Cooperation Programme</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.195</td>
<td>7.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Programme of Support to Regional Civil Society</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>2.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Institutional Support – Regional Technical Cooperation Facility</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10. TOTAL - Vulnerabilities and Social Issues</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>17.495</td>
<td>10.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL Programme Costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>165.0</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“We have high hopes in the OECS. It is the level where we are seeing results. It is advancing.”

(EU Official, Barbados & Eastern Caribbean, Interview. February 10, 2016)
## 2. Reconstruction of Haiti

CARIFORUM-EU Proposed Joint Action

| Mobilising relevant cooperation instruments in the framework of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement and the EU-LAC process |
| Supporting the functioning and consolidation of Haitian democracy through the strengthening of institutional capacity-building of the Haitian public administration, free and credible elections, respect for human rights and the rule of law, judicial reforms, the strengthening of civil society, and the fight against corruption |
| Actions to ensure Haiti's full participation in the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), and other regional or bilateral Caribbean cooperation arrangements |
| Actions in the area of disaster preparedness and risk reduction strategies, including the development of mechanisms such as a regional building code to improve the capacity of the region to mitigate the effects of natural disasters in coordination with national risk reduction strategies, Haitian disaster preparedness plans and national mechanisms |
| Facilitating cross border trade and investments and dialogue between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, inter alia through the strengthening of the Dominican-Haitian Mixed BiNational Commission, so as to bolster socio-economic conditions and integration |

(Adapted from Joint Caribbean-EU Strategy 2011, p. 8)
“Nov 3 (UNHCR) – Thirteen-year-old Joe Hullman dreams of playing baseball in his native Dominican Republic. But because he has no birth certificate or identity papers, he scavenges instead for scrap metal at the San Pedro de Macoris municipal dump.”

(http://www.unhcr.org/56386d9f6.html)
PM Gonsalves reiterates opposition to Dominican Republic policy
Monday, June 22, 2015 | 11:45 A

“simply unacceptable”

“...persons of Haitian descent born in the Dominican Republic, who, by any international standard, should be citizens of the Dominican Republic, they are denied citizenship and they are denied citizenships on ethnic grounds or grounds of national origins...”
Implication for CARIFORUM-EU Relations

“We have not had political dialogue with CARIFORUM. Members do not want to sit at the same table. We are against human rights violations... We use quiet diplomacy. From the EU’s perspective it is a migration issue. CARICOM sees it as a human rights problem. We have not had all CARIFORUM countries to sit and talk. It has undermined our work.”

(Source: EU Official, Barbados & the Eastern Caribbean, Interview. February 10, 2016)
3. Climate Change and Natural Disasters

Adapting to and mitigating the effects of climate change without prejudice to achieve the Millennium Development Goals;

Strengthening disaster risk reduction as well as enhancing monitoring, situation awareness, assessment and early warning systems for disaster management and response;

Reducing deforestation through the sustainable management of forests;

Preserving rich and vulnerable biodiversity and ecosystems hotspots;

Promoting sustainable water management;

Integrating climate change into poverty reduction efforts.

(Source JCESP, 2010, p. 9)
“Caricom was ready for Paris. A task force had been set up two years ago and the region had a well-prepared position, a short-list of critical issues, and simple but memorable branding. ...seven Caribbean Heads of Government travelled to Paris to express, at the opening, the region’s concerns, and to mobilise third-party support among the huge numbers of NGO’s, business interests, environmentalists and other present in Paris.”

Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre
Caribbean Leadership on Climate Change

“What we consider useful is more regional integration. We see no real leader like in the past...one exception was the conference in Paris on Climate Change. CARICOM stuck together and achieved quite a lot.”

(EU Official Barbados & the Eastern Caribbean, Interview. Feb 10, 2016)
4. Crime and Security

Areas of Joint Concern:

- The impact of criminal activities on human security in Caribbean societies;
- Illegal traffic and trade in small arms and light weapons;
- The proliferation of drugs trafficking and organised crime, as well as related crimes including gang violence and money laundering;
- Insufficient capacity for maritime and airspace border control;
- Fraud-related crimes, including money laundering as well as cyber crime, identity theft and copyright infringement;
- The social and security problems created by the deportation of criminals to the Caribbean;
- Trafficking in persons and kidnapping;
- Compliance with internationally-agreed standards in the financial sector.

(Source JCESP, 2010, p. 11)
The Caribbean Security Environment

Arms Trafficking Trends

- **PRIMARY MODES OF TRANSPORT**
  - GO FAST
  - SAILING VESSELS (CONTAINER SHIPS, ETC)
  - LIGHT AIRCRAFTS
- **ORIGINATING POINTS**
  - AMERICAS

- **OVERSEAS GANG LINKS**
  - MERCHANT SHIPPING

- **HONDURAN FISHING VESSELS**
  - LEGAL
  - ILLEGAL

- **COLOMBIAN NARCO LINKS**
  - VESSELS
  - AIRCRAFT

- **JAMAICA-HAITI**

- **DRUGS FOR GUNS LINKS**

**TOTAL WEAPONS SEIZED 10,146 (5 years)**
The Caribbean Security Environment

Human Trafficking Routes in the Caribbean
Drug Trafficking Routes in the Caribbean

**Main Caribbean drugs-trafficking routes**
- Overland, river & air
- Air from Venezuela
- Go-fast speedboat from Venezuela
- Small cargo vessel
- Yacht, mule, cargo, cruise ship or go-fast speedboat
- Mule or cargo

Source: The Economist
Main global cocaine flows, 2008

5. Joint Action in Multilateral Fora & on Global Issues

Proposed joint actions include, inter alia:

Working together on the promotion of human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance, including free and fair electoral processes, and combating corruption;

Working together on promoting reform of the UN System, with the aim of enhancing its representativeness, transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, including the comprehensive reform of the Security Council;

Development, whenever possible, of joint regional positions within the UN system and the International Financial Institutions and striving to support each other’s initiatives;

Contributing to the modernisation of the IMF and World Bank to, inter alia, better reflect the changing world economy through greater representation of dynamic emerging markets and developing countries;
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Support for Resolution</th>
<th>Abstained</th>
<th>Absent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbuda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Belize</td>
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<td>Dominica</td>
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<td>Grenada</td>
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<td>Guyana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; The Grenadines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
“When Russia invaded Ukraine, we expected support from CARICOM member states at the UN. But most of them abstained. They prefer to be neutral. But maybe this neutral position is not always in their long term interests.”

“...We note the sad irony that those most supportive of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence now reject that of Crimea.”... “The nature of today’s resolution and the arguments of its chief proponents have called into question the universal and consistent applicability of international law in these and similar instances.” (Caribbean Diplomat, UN, 2014)

“...the world has changed as well as interests and so each country has a responsibility to project and protect its own interests.” (Caribbean Diplomat, UN, 2014)
Findings

1. **Hegemonic (re)positioning** – EU’s enlargement, its Neighbourhood policy & geopolitics, have redefined its interests, shrinking space for traditional North-South ‘partnerships’

2. **Narrowing the Global Agenda** - As the EU aspires for global hegemony, as common threats cross developmental divides and the concerns of SIDS gain global significance, there is a narrowing of the global agenda

3. **Convergence of External & Internal forces** – the traditional ‘partnership’ between the Caribbean and the EU has been reconfigured given the confluence of external and internal forces (e.g. EU enlargement, Caribbean countries’ graduation to Middle Income status, WTO rules etc.)
Findings

4. **Caribbean search for self-definition** – Fifty odd years since independence, Caribbean countries continue to fight to define their place in the world. They embrace traditional and non-traditional ‘partners’. This redefines North-South partnerships and expands space for South-South engagements.

5. **Selective Cooperation** - In the context of dependency, Caribbean states often seek to balance neutrality and cooperation as strategies for survival in a multipolar world. This has implications for inter-regional ‘partnerships’
Conclusions

1. North-South cooperation arrangements are creatures of history and are shaped and (re)shaped by the convergence of internal and external forces which define and (re)define power and interests.

2. Common global threats (climate change & crime) are creating spaces for common global action with implications for the intersection of multilateralism & regionalism.

3. Common global security threats transcend geographic and developmental divides, creating new dimensions in inter-regional cooperation with the potential to deepen regionalisms and soften hegemony.
Conclusions

4. One of the dilemmas of small developing countries is the interplay of economic dependency and political independence.

5. The inter-relationship between cooperation and resistance has historically shaped Caribbean EU relations. In the contemporary era, the cooperation-resistance index has intensified given new manifestations of world hegemony, historical distance, the significance of common threats, ‘softer’ issues on the global agenda and diverging and converging interests.
Caribbean-EU Development Cooperation: Toward Explanations & Future Scenarios

- **Historical Bed-fellows**
  - High cooperation and low resistance
  - European accommodation & atonement/
  - Caribbean legacy of dependency and expectations (Lomé)

- **21st C Repositioning**
  - High cooperation and high resistance
  - New manifestations of world hegemony, historical distance, common threats and ‘softer’ issues on the global agenda.
  - Divergence & convergence of interests (Post Lomé)

- **Mutual Indifference**
  - Low cooperation and low resistance
  - Possible Future Scenario Post Cotonou? Possibility

- **Antagonism (Bitter Divorce)**
  - Low cooperation and high resistance
  - Possible Future Scenario Post Cotonou?
  - Low probability

Resistance Index

Cooperation Index