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MINORITY GROUPS AND TERRITORIALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND

Tuesday, April 4, 2023 | 11:00 AM
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Presented by:



Miami-Florida
Jean Monnet Center of Excellence
European and Eurasian Studies Program



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Minority Groups and Territoriality in the European Union and Beyond

Guest Speaker



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Moderator



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Florida International University

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Renat Shaykhutdinov, PhD

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
Renat Shaykhutdinov came to Florida Atlantic University in 2007 from Texas A&M University where he received his PhD. He earned his BA degrees in Political Science and International Relations, and Sociology from the University of Bosphorus in Istanbul, Turkey.

His teaching and research interests include comparative and international politics, ethnic conflict, research methods, power-sharing arrangements, decentralization, and the politics of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe.

Renat Shaykhutdinov is a native of the East European city of Kazan located in the Middle Volga Region and is fluent in Tatar, Russian, and Turkish.

Minority Groups and Territoriality in the European Union, Europe, and Beyond

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The All Minorities at Risk data sample.



NATIONS D'EUROPE

Carte des États souverains et des nations sans État



How Do State Accommodate Ethnonational Diversity?

- No Accommodation
- Personal / Cultural Autonomy
- Ethnic Political Parties
- Ethnic Quotas
- Territorial Autonomy

Table I. Ethnic groups under provisions for territorial autonomy, 1945–2000

<i>Name of group</i>	<i>Country name</i>	<i>Period of territorial autonomy</i>
Jurassians	Switzerland	1979–
Basques	Spain	1978–
Catalans	Spain	1978–
South Tyrolians	Italy	1992–
Karachay	Russia	1993–
Ingush	Russia	1993–
Buryat	Russia	1993–
Tuvinians	Russia	1993–
Yakut	Russia	1993–
Tatars	Russia	1994–
Crimean Russians	Ukraine	1991–
Afars	Ethiopia	1991–
Somalis	Ethiopia	1991–
Southerners	Sudan	1979–1982
Southerners	Sudan	1991–
Kashmiris	India	1949–1989
Mizos	India	1986–
Tripuras	India	1988–
Assamese	India	1985–
Nagas	India	1960–
Baluchis	Pakistan	1973–1974
Baluchis	Pakistan	1985–
Azerbaijanis	Iran	1946–1946
Tibetans	China	1951–1959
Turkmen	China	1946–1950
Gagauz	Moldova	1994–
Serbs	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1995–
Bouganvilleans	Papua New Guinea	1976–1986
Bouganvilleans	Papua New Guinea	2000
Scots	United Kingdom	1998–

Research article

Give peace a chance: Nonviolent protest and the creation of territorial autonomy arrangements


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Galicia

Basque





Wales



Scotland





Aosta Valley



South Tyrol (Bolzano)



Sardinia





Friuli Venezia Giulia





Åland Islands
(Swedish-speaking)





Faroe Islands





Greenland



Subcarpathian Rus' in Czechoslovakia



Hungarian Autonomy in Romania ("Stalin's legacy")




Gagauz Autonomy in Moldova



Federalism in Russia

- Way to deal with ethnic diversity
- Asymmetric federalism
- Regional power decreased
 - 7 federal districts
 - governors



Autonomous Areas in Russia



— Autonomous republic

- - - - Autonomous okrug

Birobijan is the only autonomous oblast in Russia.

^a *Chukotka Autonomous Okrug may now be independent of Magadan Oblast.*

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

738737 (R00415) 3-96





Autonomous Areas in Russia



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

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<https://www.rferl.org/a/alleged-killer-of-journalist-university-rector-shot-dead-caucasus/24887121.html>



The Six Republics of Central Russia's MIDDLE VOLGA



TATARSTAN
Area: 67,800 km²
Population: 3.8 million
Capital: Kazan, pop. 1.2 million
Official Languages: Russian, Tatar
Major Religions: Sunni Islam, Russian Orthodox Christianity



BASHKORTOSTAN
Area: 143,600 km²
Population: 4.1 million
Capital: Ufa, pop. 1.1 million
Official Languages: Russian, Bashkort
Orthodox Christianity



CHUVASHIA
Area: 18,300 km²
Population: 1.26 million
Capital: Cheboksary, pop. 454,000
Official Languages: Russian, Chuvash
Major Religions: Russian Orthodox Christianity, Paganism



MARI EL
Area: 23,300 km²
Population: 696,000
Capital: Yoshkar-Ola, pop. 249,000
Official Languages: Russian, Mari
Major Religions: Russian Orthodox Christianity, Paganism



MORDOVIA
Area: 26,200 km²
Population: 889,000
Capital: Saransk, pop. 297,000
Official Languages: Russian, Erzya, Moksha
Major Religions: Russian Orthodox Christianity, Sunni Islam



UDMURTIA
Area: 42,100 km²
Population: 1.5 million
Capital: Izhevsk, pop. 628,000
Official Languages: Russian, Udmurt
Major Religions: Russian Orthodox Christianity, Paganism



TATARSTAN



Official Name: Republic of Tatarstan

Tatar: Tatarstan Respublikası, Татарстан Республикасы

Russian: Республика Татарстан (Respublika Tatarstan)

Former Names: Tataria, Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

Official Languages: Russian and Tatar

Area: 67,800 km²

Half the size of Alabama or Greece, comparable to Sri Lanka

Population: 3.8 million

52.9% Tatar, 39.5% Russian, 3.4% Chuvash, 0.6% Udmurt, 0.6% Ukrainian, 0.6% Mordvin, 0.5% Mari, 1.9% other

Capital City: Kazan

Population: 1.1 million

Russian: Казань (Kazan')

Tatar: Qazan, Казан

Chuvash: Хусан (Khusan)

Meaning: Possibly from qazan, a wok-like Tatar cooking bowl, because the city sits in a U-shaped valley, but Chuvash folklore claims that a Bolgar prince named *Khusan* (Hassan) was the city's founder and namesake


<http://theperemechlounge.blogspot.com/2011/07/people-of-middle-volga-turkic-peoples.html>




Middle Volga and North Caucasus: Conflict


- Tatarstan:
 - “The dog that didn’t bark” (Walker 1996)
- Chechnya:
 - 2 Modern Chechen Wars
 - 1994-1996
 - 1999-2009
 - 11 years, 4 months, 1 week, and 6 days: Upper limit of the “average” of 7-12 years
 - ~50,000 civilians perished
 - Largest civil war in the post-WW2 era after Afghanistan, Laos, Vietnam, and Liberia (Zürcher 2007)

Terrorist incidents in Chechnya and Tatarstan 1991-2017



Terrorist incidents in North Caucasus and Middle Volga 1991-2017






Graphs by State



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Articles

The terrorist attacks in the Volga region, 2012–13: hegemonic narratives and everyday understandings of (in)security

Renat Shaykhutdinov

Pages 50-67 | Published online: 21 Feb 2018

[Download citation](#)
<https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2018.1436137>

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In this article

- ABSTRACT**
- Introduction
- Terror in the Middle Volga
- Theoretical approach and research design
- Analysis and discussion
- Conclusion
- References

ABSTRACT

Discussions generated in Russian and Western academic, policy-making and media circles by recent terrorist attacks in the Middle Volga and Urals (Idel-Ural) derive primarily from hegemonic state discourses and as such miss the wealth of discussion generated in local-language sources about the causes and implications of these attacks. The goal of this study is to provide an examination of the various perspectives concerning terrorism in the region, focusing on the level of Tatar (and secondarily Russian) society. Employing insights from a recent body of literature on 'everyday' and 'vernacular' (in)securities as well as on conspiracy theories, I examine Tatar-language Internet forums posted on the Radio Free Europe website related to the terror events of July 2012. I detect no incitement to violence among the Tatar-speaking participants. However, my results suggest that Tatar publics use diverse interpretive repertoires to make sense of a securitizing reality. The study suggests that Tatar-speaking publics depart in important ways from the dominant narrative of the 'police' order as well as from the *Weltanschauung* of their Russian-speaking compatriots.

KEYWORDS: Tatarstan, terrorism, Idel-Ural, social media, public opinion, everyday security; vernacular security

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Introduction

Critical approaches to security in Central Asia: an introduction >

Edward Lemon

Central Asian Survey
Volume 37, 2018 - Issue 1

Published online: 21 Feb 2018

Article

Living dangerously:

Middle Volga and North Caucasus: Puzzle

- Tatarstan and Chechnya Compared:
 - Salience of Islam in both
 - Institutional underpinnings of Soviet federalism
 - “Mafia factor” (Derulguian 1999)
- What explains the difference in political violence?

Middle Volga and North Caucasus: Puzzle

Table 1

Chechnya and Tatarstan Compared

	Chechnya	Tatarstan
Previous status	autonomous republic	autonomous republic
Population size*	1,270,429**	3,641,742
Main religion	Islam	Islam
Ethnic groups*	Chechen (57.8%), Russian (23.1%), Ingush (13%), Armenian (1%), Ukrainian (1%)	Tatars (49%), Russians (43%), Chuvash (4%), Ukrainian (0.9%), Mordovian (0.8%)
Natural resources	high-quality crude oil	oil
Main industries	oil extraction and refining, petrochemical production	oil extraction, petrochemical production, tire manufacturing, machine-building, truck production
Strategic importance	transport hub and corridor: railroad and highway linking Russia to Baku (Azerbaijan), Baku-Novorossiisk oil pipeline, gas pipelines and other supply lines of strategic importance to Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia.	defense industries, oil and gas pipelines, plane and helicopter production

Source: Sharafutdinova (2000)

- What explains the difference in political violence?

Middle Volga and North Caucasus: Previous Studies

- Most of the literature on Tatarstan and Chechnya focus on single cases studies or use the two cases in larger-N comparative or correlational studies
 - Chechnya: e.g., Meyer (2017), Wilhelmsen (2016), Gammer (2006); ~75,000 Google.Scholar results as of April 2, 2022
 - Tatarstan: Faller (2002, 2011), Graney (2009); ~97,400 results as of April 2, 2022
- Very few studies explicitly compare the two cases

Middle Volga and North Caucasus: Previous Studies

- Complex model which gives theoretical primacy to the central government as the ultimate decision-maker and executor of coercion and violence (Frombgen 1999)
- Application of World Systems Theory – economic core and periphery – for understanding divergent outcomes in both cases (Derluguian 1999)
- Theoretical significance attributed to the policy-making of local, republic-level elites (Sharafutdinova 2000)
- Theoretical focus on the mix of geographic and demographic factors (Toft 2003)
- Multiple factors (Wierzbicki & Gorlicka 2021)

Middle Volga and North Caucasus: Previous Studies

- Agreement or no disagreement on the role of



<https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/abdul-itslayev/soviet-deportation-chechnya-akhmed-tsebiyev>

Middle Volga and North Caucasus

- Culture:
 - The Chechen and, generally, mountaineer culture requires young men to prove themselves by standing out or excelling (Derulguian 1999, Gammer 2006); “survival oriented” culture (Frombgen 1999, 106)
 - Islam rejected as a factor (Derluguian 1999) vs. “Culturally Chechnya is an Islamic nation. In the beginning of the independence movement Islamic fundamentalism returned as mobilizing force” (Frombgen 1999, 108)

Comparative Ethnohistorical Lineages⁽¹¹⁾

	CHECHNYA	TATARSTAN
Early origins	Mountain frontier society; democratic tribal confederation after 16th c. expulsions of princely families. Stable anarchic system cemented by rigorous etiquette and legal codes (<i>adat</i>). Strong structural resemblance to the late Archaic Greece.	Semi-peripheral hub on the Persia-Volga trade route since the 9th c. Unit of the Mongol Empire in 13th-15th cc.

Source: Derluguian (1999)

<p>Two Islams</p>	<p>Very late conversion (17th-19th cc.). Decentralized, non-mosque Islam, with a prevalence of mystic Sufi orders (<i>Naqshbandia</i>, later <i>Qadiria</i>) Islam blends with democratic tribal institutions. Traditions of Holy War perceived as <i>patriotic</i> defense.</p>	<p>Early conversion in the 9th c. State-bound, hierarchical Islam, with an elaborate system of mosques and religious schools. Moslem culture facilitates access to Central Asian and Persian caravan routes and markets.</p>
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Source: Derluguian (1999)

<p>Russian conquest</p>	<p>Protracted resistance (Holy <i>Jihad</i>) in 1785-1864; nearly half of Chechens died or emigrated to the Ottoman empire (now in Turkey and Jordan). Armed rebellions, honorable <i>abrek</i> banditry, and Sufi mystic orders continue resistance. Rural clans remain bastions against the Empire.</p>	<p>Conquered in 1553 by Ivan the Terrible. Catherine the Great tolerates Islam and grants communal autonomy in 1783. Enlightened <i>Jadid</i> Islam arises among Tatars after 1850s.</p>
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Source: Derluguian (1999)

Before 1917	Inherently rebellious and Cossack -“pacification”; impoverished periphery unconnected to the booming — beginning in 1867 — Grozny oilfields.	Shares in the rapid economic growth of the Volga-Ural region in the 1860s-1910s.
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Source: Derluguian (1999)

Participation in the Civil war, 1918-1921	Chechen Islamists ally to the Bolsheviks in joint struggle against the pro-Whites Cossacks; mutual massacres occurs. In 1921 Chechens are rewarded Bolshevik-sponsored modern statehood.	Small liberal Islamic intelligentsia takes Bolshevik side and helps to organize Moslem Communist battalions. Stalin denounces Moslem Communism as opportunism after 1923. Tataria never receives full republic status.
Stalinist period	Collectivization of 1929-32 provokes revolt which grows into guerrilla war. In 1944 Stalin orders deportation of Chechens (one third perish). Chechen republic is abolished, but restored in 1957 by Khrushchev as joint Chechen-Ingushetia.	Persecution of Moslem Communism eliminates the entire Tatar intelligentsia. New Soviet-educated elite loses cultural ties to the Tatar past. Islam is nearly extinguished. Interethnic mixing occurs.

Source: Derluguian (1999)

<p>From Brezhnev's "stagnation" to Gorbachev's perestroika, 1964-1985</p>	<p>No armed action, but Moscow still doesn't allow Chechens to occupy sensitive positions. Inherent tensions lead to sporadic protests from educated Chechens. Economic stagnation and rapid demographic growth force many Chechen males to migrate into Russian cities (where since the 1970s some had become gangsters). Top local executives are Moscow-appointed, with token Chechen representation. Local government depends on central subsidies, party censorship, and KGB surveillance.</p>	<p>Urbanization and centrally planned industrialization of Soviet Tataria in the 1950s-1970s fosters ethnic homogenization. Many Tatars experience tremendous vertical mobility, but ethnic stereotypes remain an irritant in daily life. Nomenklatura cadres are local, with Tatars being slightly over-represented. Huge central investments are made, but with little local government control.</p>
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Source: Derluguian (1999)

Middle Volga and North Caucasus

Chechnya

- Refused to sign the Federation Treaty in 1992
- Demanded outright independence
- Military operations began Dec. 1994

Tatarstan

- Refused to sign the Federation Treaty in 1992
- Was willing to settle for a broad autonomy
- Autonomy Treaty signed in Feb. 1994

Middle Volga and North Caucasus

- Culture:
 - The Chechen and, generally, mountaineer culture requires young men to prove themselves by standing out or excelling (Derulguian 1999, Gammer 2006); “survival oriented” culture (Frombgen 1999, 106)
 - “We are an excessively modest and subservient people...We live according to the principle ‘today things are like this but tomorrow we will see.’ We aren’t capable to defend[...] ou[r] interests” (İskändär Ğıyläcev (Iskander Gilyazov), the editor of the Kazan Institute of the Tatar Encyclopedia in Goble 2018a).
 - Substantive demands of parties, clubs and social organizations of Tatar intellectual elites ranged from purely cultural and educational, such as *Mäğärif*, to overtly political, such as the *Suverenitet* Committee, *İttifaq*, *Azatlıq* Association, and TOTs. Programmatic statements of the groups avoided references to violence and, as did *Watan*’s program, explicitly “reject[ed] violence and terror” putting emphasis on attaining party goals through peaceful means (D. I. Iskhakov 1992, 23).

Middle Volga and North Caucasus: Other Factors

- Geography:
 - “...the different opportunities and constraints presented by geography are not treated here as crucial to the different outcomes in Chechnya and Tatarstan” (Sharafutdinova 2000, 16)
 - “The geographic location of a secessionist group is important ... A secessionist population that is either peripheral in nature or is situated on difficult terrain can more easily be isolated from the state both physically and psychologically” (Frombgen 1999, 94)
 - “Numerous factors contributed to adopting a specific model of ethnopolitics in both republics. Firstly, the conditions were of a geopolitical/geographical nature. Tatarstan [...], with no external borders” (Wierbicki & Gorlicka 2021: 3)
 - “...smaller, geographically peripheral, and decidedly less important economically than Tatarstan. Soberly speaking, Chechnya could only marginally affect the overall stability and configuration of the new Russian state” (Derulguian 1999)

Middle Volga and North Caucasus: Other Factors

- Oil
- External borders
- Ethnic dominance
- Mountains
- Youth bulges: 12% vs 10%
- Economic determinants

A photograph of numerous wooden figures of varying colors (light wood, orange, green, blue, red, white, and dark green) arranged on a dark, textured surface. The figures are stylized, with round heads and tapered bodies. A semi-transparent white rectangular box with yellow corner brackets is centered over the image, containing the title text.

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